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ABSTRACT
Uber is a ride-hailing smartphone application (app) that allows users to order a ride in a highly
efficient manner. The Uber app provides Mobility as a Service and allows users to easily order a ride
in a private car with just a few clicks. Uber stores large amounts of data on both the mobile device
the app is being used on, and in the cloud. Examples of this data include geolocation data, date/time,
origin/destination addresses, departure/arrival times, and distance. Uber geolocation data has been
previously researched to investigate the privacy of the Uber app; however, there is minimal research
relating to the other data the Uber app collects. Because this data could be of significance in a
forensic investigation, it is important to determine where the majority of the Uber data are stored,
either in the cloud or on the mobile device itself, and if one of these storage locations contains more
information than the other. In this study, we analyzed the Uber app by forensically imaging the
iPhone running the Uber app in three different acquisition phases. The different acquisitions allowed
us to compare the data before and after data population, determine where the majority of the Uber
data are stored, and determine if jailbreaking the iPhone provided more data than the previous
acquisitions. Obtaining and analyzing the data in this study was done using Magnet AXIOM and
Cellebrite forensic software suites.
Keywords: Uber, Mobility as a Service, Ride-Sharing Apps, Forensic Investigation, iOS Forensics,
Mobile Forensics, Cloud Forensics

1.

INTRODUCTION

Following the release of Uber’s Privacy Notice,
a similar ride-sharing app, Lyft, also reported
various crimes occurring during rides. According to Lyft’s Community Safety Report, in 2019,
over 1,800 sexual assaults were reported (Lyft,
2021). Lyft’s Community Safety Report also
stated that the amount of sexual assault reports
has continuously increased across the years, with
1,096 in 2017 to 1,255 in 2018 and 1,807 in 2019
(Press, 2021).

The mobile app, Uber, is the most used ridehailing app in the world (Toniuk, 2019), with
4.98 billion trips completed in 2020 alone (Iqbal,
2022). However, there are many reports of sexual
assaults during Uber rides (see Fig. 1). According to Uber’s Privacy Notice released in 2018,
from the years 2017 to 2018, there was a total
of 5,981 reports of sexual assault during an Uber
ride (Uber Privacy Notice, 2021). Additionally,
there were 9 reports of murder during an Uber
ride, and 58 users killed due to car accidents in
the year 2018 (Conger, 2019).

There are previous studies that explore the
connection between the geolocation data Uber
stores and user privacy. However, as the use of
1

the Uber app increases, it is necessary to analyze the data that the app collects, and determine how the data can be utilized in forensic investigations. Additionally, these previous
works have not focused on the use of the Uber
app on a specific platform. In this study, these
gaps will be filled by determining how the geolocation data and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) that the Uber app collects can be used
as evidence in forensic investigations, specifically,
on iOS devices.

This paper is organized as follows: Works related to analyzing forensic artifacts from the
Uber app is discussed in Section II. In section
III, the methodology of obtaining and analyzing the forensic images used in this study is discussed. The results of our analyses are presented
in Section IV, and discussion and conclusions are
reflected in Section V. Lastly, challenges faced
during this study are followed in Section VI, followed by future research in Section VII.

2.

RELATED WORK

In this section, the works related to Uber forensics are discussed. While previous studies regarding how Uber geolocation data can be used in a
forensic investigation are limited, works focused
on the privacy violations of the Uber app are
discussed below.
Although determining how the geolocation
data from the Uber app is forensically relevant
has not been studied, Leszczynski (2019) completed a study which discussed how Uber utilizes
Google Maps. Leszczynski (2019) reports that
the Uber app uses Google Maps that provide inroute navigation, allow the user’s real-time position to be displayed, as well as show potential
Uber drivers in the near proximity. Once a ride
is hailed, the Google Maps interface allows the
user to visually track their approaching driver in
real-time, including an estimated time of arrival
(ETA) based on any normal traffic the driver
may encounter (Leszczynski, 2019). Additionally, riders can share their real-time ride status
and estimated time of arrival with their contacts
(Leszczynski, 2019). In this study, we focus on
the user’s ride status, and attempt to recover the
trip data that the Uber app displays to its users,
focusing on where this data are stored. Additionally, we will investigate whether this data are
stored in the cloud or on the device itself.
Researchers at Northeastern University investigated how the real-time algorithm Uber uses
affects the pricing of Uber rides. According to
Chen et al. (2015), when a user opens and authenticates the Uber app to find a ride, the
Uber app sends pingClient messages to Uber’s
server every 5 seconds, in which the server re-

Figure 1: Sexual assault reports during Uber
rides in 2017 and 2018
This study of the Uber app focuses on determining what PII and geolocation data the Uber
app stores, and how this data could be used in
a forensic investigation. With increased utilization of cloud storage, we also analyze how much
data Uber stores in the cloud versus on the device the Uber app is used on. Determining the
specific PII and geolocation data, and where this
data are stored would considerably benefit any
forensic investigation where the use of Uber was
involved.
The contributions of this study includes:
• Raising awareness for the Uber app users
about what PII of theirs are stored by the
application.
• Providing an investigative roadmap and
framework to the forensic investigators to
follow when obtaining forensic evidence
from the Uber app on Apple devices.
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2021), which stated that Uber ”may also collect
the precise location of your device when the app
is running in the foreground or background.” To
complete their research, Hayes et al. (2017) completed a forensic analysis to determine which of
this user information could be recovered from the
Uber app using the software: Debookee by iwaxx
and Blacklight by BlackBag. Our study will follow a similar methodology and focus of recovering forensic artifacts from the app, however will
utilize different forensic software, Magnet AXIOM and Cellebrite.
Salamh et al. (2021) completed an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) forensic analysis in which
they utilized various forensic tools to analyze the
data are able to be recovered from two UAV
models. Included in the data that was attempted
to be recovered was PII and flight trajectories.
In this study, the forensic tools Magnet AXIOM
and Cellebrite. Salamh et al. (2021) were able
to partially recover PII, GPS tracks and flight
logs using both Magnet Axiom and Cellebrite.
Although our study utilizes the Uber app as opposed to UAVs, we will follow a similar analysis
method to obtain PII, GPS data and Uber ride
logs by utilizing Magnet AXIOM and Cellebrite
in the same manner as (Salamh et al., 2021).
Similar to (Salamh et al., 2021), Stankovic et.
al. (2021) completed a UAV forensics case study
on the DJI Mini 2 in which they utilized various
forensic tools to analyze the data are able to be
recovered from two UAV models. Included in the
data that was attempted to be recovered was PII
and flight trajectories. In this study, the forensic
tools Magnet AXIOM and Cellebrite. Salamh et
al. (2021) were able to partially recover PII, GPS
tracks and flight logs using both Magnet Axiom
and Cellebrite. Although our study utilizes the
Uber app as opposed to UAVs, we will follow a
similar analysis method to obtain PII, GPS data
and Uber ride logs by utilizing Magnet AXIOM
and Cellebrite in the same manner as (Salamh et
al., 2021).

sponds with a JSON-encoded list of available
rides (Chen et al., 2015). However, although the
ping includes geolocation data of the user, the
data are while the user is idle and not yet in the
vehicle. The authors wrote a script that acts as
if it were the Uber Client app to collect the user
geolocation data when the user is requesting a
ride, however it does not collect geolocation data
when the user’s ride is occurring (Chen et al.,
2015). Although (Leszczynski, 2019) has done a
more in-depth investigation of what geolocation
data the client has access to, our study will fill
remaining the gaps of both (Leszczynski, 2019)
and (Chen et al., 2015), by determining if the
client’s geolocation data during a ride is able to
be recovered and where it is stored.
A research group at Pace University published
research of how the Uber app violates its privacy statement by tracking the location of its
users longer than 5 minutes after the conclusion
of a ride, and when the app is not in use (Hayes,
Snow, & Altuwayjiri, 2017). However, this study
also discussed the user data that the Uber app
collects, as printed in its privacy statement. According to Uber’s privacy statement (Uber Privacy Notice, 2021), the app collects the following
user PII:
1. Personal data provided by users to Uber,
such as during account creation
2. Personal data created during the use of Uber
services, such as location, app usage, and
device data
3. Personal data from other sources, such as
other users or account owners, business
partners, vendors, insurance and financial
solution providers, and governmental authorities
Hayes et al. (2017) details the device information Uber collects, those of which are of interest
to our study include: hardware model, operating system and version, unique device identifier,
serial number, device motion information, and
mobile network information. Also referenced in
(Hayes et al., 2017) was another statement from
Uber’s privacy statement (Uber Privacy Notice,

3.

METHODOLOGY

This study follows the standard mobile forensic
procedures put forth by the National Institute
3

Table 1: Details of Software Used
Forensic Software
Magnet AXIOM Process
Magnet AXIOM Examine
Cellebrite UFED 4PC
Cellebrite Physical Analyzer
Cellebrite Reader

6. Perform an advanced logical full file system
acquisition using Cellebrite UFED 4PC.

Version
4.11.0.233338
4.11.0.233338
7.44.0.80
7.42.0.50
7.42.0.50

7. Perform full file system analyses of all acquisitions using Magnet AXIOM and Cellebrite
Physical Analyzer.
The general methodology used to collect Uber
data and obtain and analyze forensic images for
this study is shown in Fig. 2.

of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Ayers,
Brothers, & Jansen, n.d.) to obtain and analyze images on the device chosen for this study.
The device utilized and chosen was an iPhone 7
Plus running iOS 13.5.1 which was pre-populated
with Uber data. The iPhone 7 Plus was used to
ensure the device could be jailbroken.
The tools used for acquisition and analysis are
depicted in Table 1 with their version numbers.
These tools were utilized as they are court accepted forensics tools and have the ability to acquire the necessary types of forensic images from
iPhones. Initially, Magnet AXIOM was intended
to be the sole software used in this study. However, after multiple failed logical acquisitions,
Cellebrite UFED 4PC was used instead.
Two forensic workstations were used in this
study. The first was an ASUS ZenBook running
Windows 10 Home 64-Bit, utilizing an AMD
Ryzen 5 4500U CPU with 8GB of RAM. The second was and a desktop computer running Windows 10 64-bit and utilizing an Intel Core i78700K processor with 16GB of RAM.
Existing iCloud and Uber accounts were used
in this study. The following steps involved in this
study include:

3.1

Data Population

The Uber app with an active user account was
already downloaded onto the iPhone 7 Plus. The
iPhone was pre-populated with Uber data with
trips from 2015 - present.
Once the pre-populated data had been acquired, the iPhone was populated with test data
in accordance with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Standards (Ayers
et al., n.d.). The test data was obtained by using the Uber app for transportation, and consisted of multiple Uber rides using the iPhone
7 Plus. When sample data was being collected,
location services and connection to a personal
hotspot were enabled to allow the app to collect
data without being connected to Wi-Fi or a cellular network.

3.2

Analysis

Initial forensic imaging was completed in order
to analyze the Uber data that was pre-populated
on the iPhone 7 Plus. Both a logical and a cloud
acquisition were completed using Magnet AXIOM. In order to carry out a cloud acquisition,
iCloud credentials were entered during the imaging process. A logical acquisition was completed
as only the Uber app data was necessary to obtain. A cloud acquisition was completed to determine what information Uber stores in the cloud.
With both acquisitions, it would then be possible to determine how much data are stored in
the cloud versus the device itself.
Once these initial images were obtained, the
sample data was collected by using the Uber
app on the test device in accordance with the
NIST Standards (Ayers et al., n.d.). After data
population, additional logical and cloud acquisitions were obtained using Magnet AXIOM and

1. Obtain an iPhone 7 Plus with previously
downloaded Uber app.
2. Perform baseline logical and cloud acquisitions using Magnet AXIOM.
3. Examine the baseline logical and cloud images using Magnet AXIOM.
4. Populate the device with data in accordance
with the NIST guidelines.
5. Perform second logical and cloud acquisitions.
4

Figure 2: Research methodology flow chart
Table 2: Details of Acquisitions Performed
Acquisition Type

Forensic Software Used

Logical #1

Magnet AXIOM

Cloud #1

Magnet AXIOM

Logical #2

Cellebrite UFED

Cloud #2

Magnet AXIOM

Physical

Cellebrite UFED

Cellebrite UFED. By re-imaging the iPhone 7
Plus after data population, it was possible to determine where the data from the test rides were
stored.
Once the second round of logical and cloud
acquisitions were complete, the device was jailbroken and an advanced logical image was acquired using Cellebrite UFED. By obtaining an
advanced logical image, we could then determine
if more data was available than the previous logical and cloud images. Additionally, a thorough
analysis of the file system would be possible as
the iPhone was jailbroken. Each acquisition is
depicted in Table 2.
All acquisitions were then analyzed using Magnet AXIOM Examine, Cellebrite Physical Analyzer, and Cellebrite Reader. A full file system
analysis of each acquisition was performed.
Upon obtaining the images, there were two
main goals of this study:

Purpose
Obtain pre-populated
data
Obtain pre-populated
data
Obtain data after data
population
Obtain cloud data after
data population
Obtain bit-by-bit image
after data population

1. Compare the logical/cloud acquisitions to
the advanced logical acquisition to determine if more Uber data can be obtained after jailbreaking the iPhone.
2. Determine the data that can be recovered
from each of the three types of acquisitions
(Logical, cloud, and advanced logical).

4.
4.1

RESULTS

First Logical & Cloud
Acquisitions

The 1st logical acquisition was obtained using
Magnet AXIOM. The acquisition found 8 Uber
Cached Locations stored on the iPhone 7 Plus.
The Uber trip data obtained from the 8 cached
locations includes: Address, Latitude, Longitude, Date/Time, and a Tag for 1 address (see
Fig. 3).
5

Figure 3: Data obtained from the first logical acquisition, 8 cached Uber trips
\app \com.ubercab.UberClient \Library \app
Support \com.uber.MegaLib \unified-reporterclient.uspan.objectfeed\000196.log file (see Fig.
5). Two additional log files, 000186.log and
000189.log, stored similar Uber data and were
located at the same path location, however, the
file 000196.log stored the most information (see
Fig. 7).
The 2nd cloud acquisition was completed
using Magnet AXIOM. 357 Uber trips were
stored following data population. The Uber trip
data obtained from the 357 locations stored in
the cloud include: Origin address, origin latitude/longitude, departure date and time, destination address, destination latitude/longitude,
arrival date/time, rider ID, ride distance, ride
duration, cost, trip status, trip ID, driver name,
driver ID, vehicle make and year, map title URL,
attachments, and the image source (see Fig. 8).

The Uber trip data obtained from the 353
trips stored in the cloud include: Origin address, origin latitude/longitude, departure date
and time, destination address, destination latitude/longitude, arrival date/time, rider ID, ride
distance, ride duration, cost, trip status, trip ID,
driver name, driver ID, vehicle make and year,
map title URL, any attachments, and the image
source (see Fig. 4).

4.2

Second Logical & Cloud
Acquisitions

Following data population, the 2nd logical acquisition was obtained using Cellebrite UFED.
The acquisition found 4 Uber cached locations
stored on the iPhone 7 Plus. The Uber trip data
obtained from the 4 cached locations includes:
timestamp, address, and latitude/longitude (see
Fig. 5).
File system analysis showed that Uber
cached locations were stored in \Nina’s
Iphone\mobile
\Containers
\Data
\app
\com.ubercab.UberClient\documents\database.db
file, in the place table. The place table stored
information from 4 Uber cached locations.
These recovered artifacts include a timestamp in
Epoch time, uber id, address (title segment, subtitle segment), and GPS location (latitude v2,
longitude v2 ) (see Fig. 6)
Additional analysis of the file system revealed
additional data from the Uber app was stored
in \Nina’s Iphone \mobile \Containers \Data

4.3

Advanced Logical Acquisition

The advanced logical acquisition was obtained
using Cellebrite UFED 4PC and imaged the
full file system of the iPhone, and also utilized
the jailbreak exploit, checkm8. The acquisition
found 4 Uber Cached locations stored on the
iPhone 7 Plus. The data from these 4 Uber
trips were stored in a database in the table
fts place table.
Additionally, addresses from Uber rides were
stored in the table fts place table segdir. However, the older rides were not organized in a way
6

Figure 4: Partial cloud data obtained from the first Cloud acquisition, 353 Uber trips

Figure 5: Data obtained from the second logical acquisition, 4 cached Uber trips

Figure 6: Data obtained from the second logical acquisition, 4 Uber locations stored in
com.cab.UberClient database.db file

Figure 7: Data obtained from the second logical acquisition, Uber data stored in 000196.log file
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Figure 8: Cloud data obtained from the second Cloud acquisition, 357 Uber trips
\Containers \Data \app \4CABB07F-4A8C49B6-A05C-3001101DAC1F \Library \app
Support \com.ubercab.UberClient \storagev2.
Further file system analysis contained additional Uber timestamp data stored in \File Systems \DarArchive \root \private \var \mobile
\Containers \Data \app \4CABB07F-4A8C49B6-A05C-3001101DAC1F \Library \Caches
\com.ubercab.UberClient
\com.uber.images
\cache.db file, in the table cfurl cache response
(See Fig. 15).

that accurate location data could be obtained as
the addresses were split apart (see Fig. 9). However, the more recently used addresses were able
to be interpreted very easily as they were organized neatly in the table (see Fig. 10).
Of the 4 stored Uber locations, 2 of them
stored a much larger amount of geolocation data.
The dates of these 2 Uber rides were 7/26/2020
and 4/7/2021. For these 2 Uber rides, geolocation data was stored each second (see Fig. 11).
Once exporting this second-by-second data for
each date, it was opened in Google Earth and
mapped an exact route of the Uber ride (see Figs.
12 and 13). However, geolocation data for the
Uber ride on 7/26/2020 was not collected a for
the entire ride, unlike the Uber ride on 4/7/2021.

5.

DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS

When comparing the results of the 1st logical/cloud acquisitions versus the 2nd, the logical acquisition with Magnet AXIOM collected 8
Uber Cached locations versus Cellebrite UFED
4PC, which only collected 4. In both the 1st
and 2nd acquisitions, the cloud acquisition collected much more information about each Uber
ride than logical acquisition (see Table 3).
When comparing the results of both logical/cloud acquisitions versus the advanced logical acquisition, the cloud acquisition provides
the most detailed data for each individual ride,
such as the starting point and destination coordinates, and also the most PII about both the
user and the driver. The advanced logical acquisition provides the most detailed geolocation
data as for certain rides, geolocation data was

Additional analysis of the file system revealed additional data from the Uber app
was stored in \File Systems \DarArchive
\root \private \var \mobile \Containers
\Data \app \4CABB07F-4A8C-49B6-A05C3001101DAC1F
\Library
\app
Support
\com.ubercab.UberClient \storagev2 \unifiedreporter-client.analytics.objectfeed \001407.log
file (see Fig. 14). Seven additional log files,
000129.log, 001056.log, 001282.log, 001296.log,
000357.log, 001325.log and 000995.log stored
similar Uber data, however, the file 001407.log
stored the most information.
The additional log files were stored in \File Systems
\DarArchive \root \private \var \mobile
8

Figure 9: Older addresses from Uber rides in fts place table segdir

Figure 10: Recent addresses from Uber rides in fts place table segdir

Figure 11: Stored geolocation data (only last 10 records shown here)
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Table 3: Comparison of Cloud and Logical Acquisitions
Data Stored in
Cloud Acquisitions
Origin address/coordinates
Departure address/coordinates
Departure/arrival date/time
Rider ID
Ride distance/duration/cost
Trip ID/status
Driver name/ID
Vehicle make/year

Data Stored
in Logical
Acquisitions
Address
Coordinates
Date/time

collected each second to provide a time stamp for
every point during the Uber ride, ultimately constructing a second-by-second ride route. However, when comparing the log files from the 2nd
logical acquisition to those from the advanced
logical acquisition, they appear to contain similar Uber data. The main difference being that
the advanced logical acquisition provided more
log files than the 2nd logical acquisition, and the
log files themselves contained more data.
The forensic analysis of the Uber mobile app
indicates that a large amount of forensicallyrelevant PII and geolocation data can be obtained from Uber, including both data stored in
the cloud and data stored on the device. This
information will allow forensic investigators to
locate exactly where the Uber vehicle was for a
certain date and time, and also collect specific
information about the rider, the driver and the
ride itself.

Figure 12: Uber ride from 7/26/2020 with precise geolocation data for a portion of the route

6.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Future research could include further analysis
with Cellebrite UFED 4PC to determine why the
2 Uber rides with the most comprehensive geolocation data were so far apart in time, and why
comprehensive geolocation data was not stored
the same way for more recent Uber rides. Additionally, future research could include carrying
out the same methodology of this study but instead utilizing Cellebrite UFED 4PC cloud software to determine if more geolocation data that
is similar to the 2 rides from 7/26/2020 and

Figure 13: Uber ride from 4/7/2021 with precise
geolocation data for the duration of the route

10

Figure 14: Data obtained from advanced logical acquisition, Uber data stored in 001407.log file
4/7/2021 could be obtained. Lastly, future work
further investigating the Uber data contained in
the log files from the logical acquisitions and
comparing it to that of the advanced logical acquisition.
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